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Problem Statement 
 
The role of state and federal government agencies in land management has 
evolved over time.  Fedkiw (1989) notes that prior to the late 1800s federal land policy 
had been one of transferring the “public domain” to state and private ownership.  
However, the rapid decline in the forested area of the United States during the last half of 
the 1800s contributed to efforts to preserve and restore forests and other lands, both at the 
national and state levels.  In 1916, the system of national parks was established with the 
founding of the National Parks Service.  By the 2003, the federal government also 
preserved 187.86 million acres in the national forest system (National Forest Data Base, 
2003).  State parks also emerged near the end of the 19
th century (Fedkiw), and today 
there are more than 12 million acres administered by state park agencies (NASPD).  In 
1964, Congress enacted the Land and Water Conservation Fund, and 5.6 million acres of 
local, state, and federal parks and recreation land have been acquired, largely near heavily 
populated areas. 
  Recent concerns focus on an urbanizing America with farmland in decline or 
being converted to other uses across the entire U.S.  In the 1960’s, interest in farmland 
protection evolved from a series of isolated, localized actions to a national movement. 
This set the stage for creation of local, federal, and state laws to protect private 
agricultural lands. Farmland protection programs are used to preserve farmland in the 
U.S. and specifically to influence land development decisions in a particular area. In 
addition, the farmland preservation programs were designed to ensure food security, 
create economic opportunities, protect natural resources, sustain quality of life, and allow 
for community investment in rural and agricultural infrastructure.    3
The adoption of farmland protection programs has followed a general progression 
over time. First, early preservation policies were often based on agricultural/rural 
residential zoning, which is a regulatory approach mainly, intended to isolate 
incompatible land uses and to limit the density of residential development (Solberg and 
Pfister).  Given that zoning may be ineffective or viewed as unfairly infringing on 
landowner rights (Whyte), a second generation of policies emerged to increase the 
economic viability of agriculture. One example is differential tax assessment, which 
mandates that farmland be taxed at its agricultural value rather than its higher developed 
value.  This policy is designed to delay urban development by providing tax savings to 
land owners.  When the second generation policies were viewed as insufficient, a third 
generation of programs emerged to combine tax relief with the creation of regions in 
which agriculture is the preferred and protected use. These include the formation of 
agricultural districts, the passage of right-to-farm laws, and designation of urban growth 
boundaries.  Fourth generation land preservation policies are largely based on the use of 
conservation easements, including purchase of development rights (PDR) and transfer of 
development rights (TDR). 
State and county governments in all 50 states have adopted some type of farmland 
protection program. Consequently, it is pertinent to assess the impact of these programs 
on the rate of urban development. Rural-urban land use decisions may be affected by 
several factors across space and through time, and a targeted analysis of the farmland 
preservation programs must control for the influences of population dynamics, household 
income, farm revenue, and other land use determinants.  The results of an analysis of 
rural-urban land-use patterns can help us understand the impact of existing farmland   4
protection policies and may be able to provide guidance for the direction of future land 
preservation policies.  
 
Objectives and Hypotheses 
  The overall objective of this study is to evaluate the impacts of farmland 
preservation programs in the Northeastern United States from 1982 to 1997.  Specifically, 
the focus will be on the impact of active Purchase of Development Rights (PDR) or 
Purchase of Agricultural Conservation Easements (PACE) programs on urban 
development rates. Under PDR programs, the development rights to farmland are 
purchased and severed from the fee-simple bundle of ownership rights.  PDR programs 
allow the government and other private organizations to permanently extinguish 
development rights to agricultural lands, and the private landowner is compensated for 
the forgone property right and retains all other rights, including the right to continue 
farming.  To date, these programs have protected over 1.14 millions acres at a cost of 
$1.10 billion (AFT, 2004).  In addition, the 2002 Farm Bill (Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act) has authorized an average of $100 million per year over five years to 
assist in local preservation efforts. 
  Over the past three decades, PDR programs have been increasingly used to 
preserve farmland while avoiding problems associated with the other farmland protection 
methods.  Farmers or other landowners are not forced to preserve the land but voluntarily 
sell the development rights to their land.  However, once these development rights are 
sold, the land can never be developed as the easement applies to all subsequent owners 
(unless the program allows for buy-back or release of the rights to the owner at some   5
future time).  PDR programs do not give the public the right to use the land for 
recreational or other uses (AFT, 1997), but some other minor restrictions may be imposed 
to encourage wise stewardship of the land (e.g. using Best Management Practices for 
both agricultural and forestry activities).  Otherwise there is no real change in how the 
farmer can use the land once the development rights have been sold.   
The process for implementing a state or local PDR program tends to be more 
complicated than that of agricultural zoning ordinances.  The state or municipality must 
first decide on an area or areas that will be targeted for farmland protection.  Several 
factors are taken into consideration when selecting targeted preservation areas, including 
current development pressures, future development pressures, the productive capacity for 
agriculture, and the future viability of agriculture.  One important goal of most PDR 
programs is to preserve enough farms in the preservation area to retain a critical mass of 
farmland (Daniels, 1991).   
  There are two basic ways that farmers are compensated for relinquishing their 
development rights.  The first way is to pay the full difference between the fair market 
value (what it is worth if sold for potential development) and the fair agricultural value 
(what it is worth as agricultural land). It is important to note that the agricultural value 
and development value are the present value of discounted streams of future returns.  An 
appraiser is usually retained to determine these values.  For example, if the development 
rights are purchased on farmland that has a $2,000 per acre development value and a 
$500 per acre agricultural value, the development rights will sell for $1,500 per acre 
under this approach.    6
  However, many localities offer less than the full difference between the 
development value and the agricultural value (Daniels and Bowers, 1997).  This 
alternative compensation scheme is feasible because many farmers would rather not 
develop land that they have been working for decades and may have belonged to their 
family for generations.  Thus the sentimental value of the farmland may influence the 
amount farmers are willing to accept for their development rights.  The existence of this 
sentimental value is why many farmers choose not to develop their land when, from a 
strict financial standpoint, they may be much better off to sell.  The PDR payment 
becomes the development value less the agricultural value plus the sentimental value of 
the farmland.  In reality, however, the PDR payment may be the lowest price at which the 
program administrator would still expect to preserve enough farmland to meet program 
objectives. 
There are many additional advantages to PDR programs.  First, the compensation 
paid to farmers can provide working capital for farm operations and may aid in 
rejuvenating local farming economies (Daniels, 1997).  Second, PDR programs may keep 
farmland at affordable prices for both current farm expansion or for beginning farmers 
entering the market because the development value of the land is essentially eliminated 
(Pfeffer and Lapping, 1994).  The price of the land will be determined by farmers bidding 
on it for its value as productive agricultural land, not its value for development. Third, it 
can prevent land from being taxed out of agriculture because once the development rights 
have been separated from the land, the value of the parcel typically declines to its 
agricultural value thus reducing the inheritance tax liability.   7
  There are some key disadvantages associated with the PDR programs.   First and 
foremost, they can be expensive.  State PDR programs have spent an average of $1,488 
per acre to acquire development rights while local programs have spent an average of 
$1,704 per acre (AFT, 1997).  High easement costs may prevent a significant amount of 
farmland from being preserved.  At $1,500 per acre, a PDR program requires $30 million 
to preserve 20,000 acres or roughly 50 medium sized farms in the eastern U.S.  Although 
most programs use general bonds that increase property taxes to fund PDR programs, it 
appears that most of the successful programs rely on more creative means such as real 
estate transfer taxes, agricultural transfer taxes, and sales tax increases (AFT, 1997).  
However, the timing of the PDR program implementation can help to reduce costs.  The 
earlier the program is implemented, all other things being equal, the lower the cost of the 
conservation easements.   
A second major disadvantage is that funding is often limited, and the amount of 
land offered for enrollment in PDR programs typically exceeds the available funds.  The 
funding limitations often lead to long waiting lists for PDR enrollment, and some of this 
land may be developed before it is preserved.  PDR programs may use such situations to 
their advantage by decreasing the price paid for the development rights.  Program 
administrators may also let the market determine what price should be paid for the 
development rights.  Given that farmers have different sentimental value for their land, 
those farmers whose sentimental values are highest would be willing to sell the 
development rights at a lower price.  For example in the Maryland state PDR program 
and in some of the individual county programs, landowners bid in this competitive 
process and the lower bids are selected for PDR purchases (Daniels and Bowers, 1997).    8
Another method to balance funding needs and availability is to reduce the area targeted 
for the PDR program.  This effectively reduces the aggregate development value of the 
eligible land. 
Another disadvantage of PDR programs is that they are voluntary, and owners of 
targeted farmland may choose not to participate.  This could lead programs to protect 
scattered parcels without preserving the critical mass of adjacent lands needed to keep 
farming viable (Daniels, 1991). As well, a contingency plan is needed if farming becomes 
unprofitable in the areas with PDR programs.  All states except New Jersey allow a 
buyback of the easements if it can be demonstrated to the program administrator’s 
satisfaction that farming can no longer be profitable or if there are too many conflicts 
with suburban neighbors (Daniels and Bowers, 1997).   
A fourth disadvantage is the relatively high administrative costs of PDR 
programs, including establishment, implementation, monitoring, and enforcement of the 
program. Because the easement payment is a one-time transfer, future generations of 
farmers will not directly benefit from this initial payment. Finally, PDR programs may 
help control high-density land development, but, there may be pressures to use these 
lands for rural estates or recreational lands.  This pressure would tend to drive up the land 
prices beyond what farmers can afford to pay for the productive value.  To avoid this 
possibility, some programs require notification of all proposed sales and retain the right 
of first refusal, giving the government agency the option to buy the land with the intent to 
resell for agricultural use (Freedgood, 1991). 
Overall, PDR programs possess a number of attributes that lend themselves to 
effective farmland preservation.  On lands that have been protected, they maintain   9
affordable farmland prices, provide permanent protection, eliminate the impermanence 
syndrome (characterized by a high degree of uncertainty among farmers about their 
ability to continue productive operations in areas beset by rapid population growth), 
protect water and other natural resources, provide open space amenities and contribute to 
local food sources. 
In this paper, we seek to further our understanding of PDR programs by first 
reviewing some of the existing research findings.  Then, we develop an analytical model 
of the effect of PDR programs on urban spatial development patterns and land prices.  
Our modeling approach is based on the intertemporal model developed by Capozza and 
Helsley (1989).  We extend this model to include endogenously determined purchases of 
development rights from landowners, and derive comparative static effects.  We then use 
county-level data on land conversion and PDR program activity in the Northeast U.S. and 
empirically analyze the impacts of PDR program activity on (1) the urban development 
rate within each county and (2) the urban development rate in neighboring counties (i.e., 
spillover effects).  The tests are based on an econometric model that controls for 
demographic changes, levels of infrastructure, and factors related to landowners and farm 
returns.  The concluding section includes remarks on the limitations of the analysis as 
well as ways in which this research may be extended. 
 
Previous work on Farmland Protection Programs 
  Feather and Barnard (2003) analyze the benefits and costs of PDR programs and 
develop an econometric model of the factors influencing the creation of PDR programs 
and the amount of farmland preserved.  Benefits are represented by “willingness to pay”   10
and costs are represented by direct government costs of the PDR programs.  A censored 
regression approach is used to identify the factors explaining the existence of PDR 
programs. In the first stage a probit model is estimated for the binary dependent variable 
indicating whether a given county has a PDR program.  The independent variables are 
factors that may influence the adoption of a PDR program such as income, population 
density, and agricultural land density.  The second stage of the analysis models the 
quantity of land preserved with a censored regression model.  The independent variables 
are the inverse Mills ratio from the probit model and the variables used as independent 
variables in the first stage.  State dummy variables are included in both models to account 
for regional variation. The county-level estimation is conducted with data from seven of 
the most active states (Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
Delaware, and Vermont).  
Results from the first-stage probit estimation shows that mean income and 
agricultural land density are both statistically significant and as expected have positive 
influence on the existence of a PDR program. Except in one case, urban influence and the 
change in urban influence have unexpected negative signs, and are not statistically 
different from zero.  The change in agricultural density has a positive sign, but estimated 
coefficient is not statistically different from zero. As expected, state-specific dummies 
differ from each other in the model. In the censored regression model all variables except 
urban influence have the expected positive sign and all are statistically different from 
zero.  All state dummy variables are statistically different from one another. To determine 
the impact of descriptive factors on land preserved, the authors calculate the associated   11
elasticities. The results suggest that land preserved is quite responsive to income, urban 
influence and the change in urban influence.  
  Lynch and Musser (2001) evaluate the efficiency of agricultural land preservation 
under PDR and other programs in four Maryland counties using a Farrell efficiency 
analysis. The goals of these programs (e.g. maximizing the number of preserved parcels, 
preserving productive farms, and preserving parcels threatened by development pressure) 
are considered as a multiple outputs for evaluation under both technical and cost 
efficiency.  The inputs are the characteristics of the individual land parcels.  
The results suggest that the levels of cost and technical efficiency are quite high. 
Also it was found that the programs make trade-offs between different characteristics of 
preserved parcels. For example, an efficient parcel with a high percentage of crop land 
may be more distant from urban center if compared with a parcel close to urban center 
but with lower percentage of crop land. The parcel characteristics that appear to be 
relevant are the number of acres, percent of prime soil, and percent of crop land. The 
efficiency outcomes for all programs depend on the institutional environment. If the rules 
of the programs such as the assessment of development rights or the method of 
compensation were changed, the programs might achieve a higher level of efficiency. It 
was also determined that a combination of the instrumental tools of different programs 
may be necessary for achieving the desired objectives.  
Wichelns and Nakao (2001) examine the changes in farming activities that have 
occurred over time on farms participating in PDR programs and determine whether these 
changes are consistent with program goals. The study area is 43 farms participating in 
Rhode Island’s PDR program that started in 1983.  The paper demonstrates that many of   12
the farms participating in the PDR program had changed since enrollment. For example, 
six of twelve dairy farms had been converted to an alternative farm type such as 
vegetable farms, a heifer operation, and a horse riding farm.  Three of six potato farms 
have become a vegetable farm, a field crop farm, and a fruit farm. These changes are very 
similar to changes on the parcels that were not active in the PDR programs. The authors 
conclude that agricultural production is maintained on the farms participating in PDR, but 
there is a noticeably shift towards value-added production and recreation business.  
Nickerson and Lynch (2001) empirically test if the development restrictions 
imposed by permanent PDR/TDR (transfer of development rights) programs significantly 
reduce the farmland value in three selected counties in Maryland. The dependent variable 
in the model is the log of the sales price per acre of land sold in the county, and the 
independent variables are the vector of parcel characteristics that influence net returns 
both from agricultural and development uses, a binary variable for program participation, 
and the vector of the inverse Mills ratios to correct for selectivity bias due to voluntary 
participation. 
To determine whether or not participation in PDR/TDR programs significantly 
reduce the sales prices of farmland, three modifications of the sale price model are 
employed. The first assumes the same marginal value for each parcel characteristic for 
unrestricted and restricted parcels. The second assumes different marginal values for 
restricted and unrestricted parcels. The third assumes lower sales prices for restricted 
parcels.  The results of the first specification suggest that the parcels that are larger, 
farther from employment centers, or in forest areas receive a significantly lower price per 
acre, but preservation does not significantly reduce the price of a restricted parcel. The   13
results of the second model show little evidence to support the hypothesis that restricted 
and unrestricted parcels have different marginal values.  The results of the third model 
are quite similar to the first. Overall, the study provides little statistical evidence that the 
implementation of PDR/TDR programs in Maryland counties significantly decreases the 
farmland prices. In addition, there is little evidence to suggest that the sales price of a 
parcel depends on parcel characteristics such as distance to nearest city. 
 
An Intertemporal Model of Land Development 
Following Capozza and Helsley (1989), the urban area is assumed to reside on a 
homogenous two-dimensional plane.  We add the assumption that the distance from the 
central business district (CBD) is bounded as 
1/2 z0 ,
- È ˘ Œp Î ˚.  As such, the region in which 
the urban area resides is a circle of area one, and the area of any subset within the circle 
may be interpreted as the share of the available land resource.  The N(t) households in the 
urban area at time t are identical and consume X units of the composite good and L0 >  
units of the land good to generate utility  ( ) ,L U X .  The utility function is assumed to be 
homogeneous of degree one such that 
(1)  ()
XX
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Consumers pay rent R for the fixed land good and commuting cost T > 0 per unit distance 
z from the central business district.  The composite good is the numeraire good, and the 
consumer's budget constraint is yXR LT z =+ +  given household income of y.  If the 
land market is in equilibrium, the land consumed by all urban residents equals the area of 
the city such that   14
(2)  ( ) ( )
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where  ( ) zt is the boundary (radius) of the urban area at time t 
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Capozza and Helsley also assume that the population of the urban area grows 
exponentially at rate g > 0 such that  ( ) ( ) ( ) Nt N0e x pg t = .  By substitution, the urban 
boundary at time t is 
(4)  () () ()() ()
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and future boundary points are 
(5)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) zz t e x p t t= t - 2  
for all t≥ .    t
Let  ( ) , z Rt  represent the rent associated with urban property at time t and a 
location z distance units from the central business district.  The price per unit of 
developed land at time t and location z is assumed to be the discounted net present value 
of future rents 
(6) 
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where A is the return from agricultural production, r > 0 is the intertemporal discount 
rate, and C is the per unit cost of converting agricultural land to urban uses.  The four 
components of P
d are (a) the present value of future agricultural returns, (b) the value of   15
capital improvements created during conversion, (c) the value of accessibility to the 
central business district, and (d) the growth premium associated with future urban rents 
(We also implicitly assume g < 2r in order for the future rents term (d) to be meaningful).  
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is composed of (a) the present value of agricultural returns and (b) the present value of 
urban rents earned after the land is converted to urban use in some later period t*.  Given 
that agricultural land has not been altered to support dwellings for households, the values 
of the post-development capital improvements C and accessibility to the central business 
district (i.e., components (b) and (c) in equation (6)) are not part of the agricultural land 
price.  Capozza and Helsley demonstrate that certain properties of purely static models 
(e.g., rents falling with distance from the urban center to offset rising transportation costs, 
the price of land at the urban boundary equals the value of agricultural rents) do not hold 
in an intertemporal context. 
 
Incorporating the Purchase of Development Rights 
We now extend the basic intertemporal model to incorporate a purchase of development 
rights (PDR) program.  The easements established under the PDR program permanently 
remove the right to develop this farmland for urban uses.  Suppose a PDR program is 
established at time 0 so that only a fraction (0 ) of the land outside the initial urban 
area 
1 <b£
( ) z0 may be developed for urban uses.  The number of new residents added to the 
urban area from time 0 to time t is   16
(8)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Nt N0 N0 e x pg t 1 -= -  
and the urban boundary  ( ) zt at time t must satisfy 
(9)  () () ( ) () () ( )
22
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After rearranging terms, we derive the squared urban boundary at time t 
(10)  () ( ) ( ) ( ) () () ( ) () ()
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The resulting value of  ( ) z t  will be slightly larger if we omit the second term in equation 
(10), but we can safely ignore this term if the initial urban area is small relative to the 
region (i.e.,  ( )
2 z0 p  is much less than 1) and the PDR program attracts a relatively small 
fraction of the available land (i.e., 1  is near zero).  When this holds,  -b ( ) z t  can be 
expressed as 
(11)  () ( ) ( )
1/2




Note that the price of agricultural land enrolled in the PDR program is only composed of 
the agricultural returns component, A/r (i.e., term (a) in equation (6) or (7)).  By 
comparing the boundaries in equations (4) and (11), we find that the urban boundary 
must push farther from the central business district in order to satisfy the housing needs 
of the growing urban population if the PDR program is active (i.e., β < 1).  The land 
added to the urban area (i.e., between  ( ) z t  and  ( ) z 0 ) includes newly developed 
properties as well as agricultural land protected under the PDR program.  The land that 
remains outside the urban boundary  ( ) z t  is unprotected agricultural land and agricultural 
land protected under the PDR program.   17
Given the new urban boundary, we can use the results of Capozza and Helsley 
(1989) to derive the prices per unit of developed land within  ( ) zt 
(12)  () ( ) ( ) () ()
d
1/2 1/2
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and unprotected agricultural land outside  ( ) zt 
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under the PDR program.  Note that both land prices increase under the PDR program 
because the future urban rents components (i.e., (d) in equation (6) and (b) in equation 
(7)) increase.  In other words, land is more valuable because the optimal development 
time is advanced.  The PDR program is not assumed to influence the agricultural returns 
A, the conversion cost C, or the urban accessibility value. 
The share of land developed for urban uses β may be endogenously determined 
under suitable assumptions on the operation of the PDR program.  Suppose the local 
government provides funds B(t) ≥0  to purchase development rights on land between time 
0 and time t.  If only returns on land investments matter to landowners, the landowners 
will be indifferent between participation in the PDR program and holding the land for 
later development if the easement payment equals the option value associated with the 
post-development urban rents (i.e., second term in (13)).  In practice, landowners may be 
willing to sell the easements for less than the option value for several reasons. First, the 
easement payment provides a source of cash flow that may ease debt constraints. Such 
constraints have been cited as one significant source of management concern for   18
agricultural landowners.  Second, the increased liquidity generated by the easement sale 
may help landowners with estate planning considerations. 
To simplify the problem, we assume the average value of the easement payments 
equals the option value associated with land developed at the mid-point of the program 
period 
(14)  () () ( ) () 1/2
Tg
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and the parcels enrolled in the PDR program are assumed to be uniformly distributed 
outside the urban boundary  ( ) z 0 .  Our use of the average easement payment (14) to 
derive the number of land units enrolled in the PDR program (15) does not imply that the 
easement payments are identical for all parcels protected under the program.  If there 
exists latent heterogeneity in the easement payments, those landowners who receive 
easement offers greater than their reservation price (i.e., option value) will enroll land in 
the PDR program. Further, the assumed uniform distribution of enrolled land is not 
unrealistic. Some PDR agencies purposefully attempt to preserve land in spatially 
uniform patterns for equity reasons.  Also, there is some evidence that even in programs 
in which non-uniform preservation patterns are preferred by agencies (e.g., clusters of 
preserved parcels) there is little evidence such patterns are achieved (Lynch and Musser; 
Nickerson and Bockstael). 
The number of land units enrolled in the PDR program is the program expenditure 
B(t) divided by the average easement payment 
(15)  ( )
()
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
()
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Given that the total area in the region is normalized to one, the land enrolled in the PDR 
program represents the share of all land outside the initial urban area that is now 
protected from development 
(16)  () () ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
()
1/2
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A spatial equilibrium is achieved at the value of β that satisfies this implicit expression. 
 
Comparative Static Analysis 
To evaluate the impact of changes in PDR program expenditures B(t) and other 
exogenous factors on the share of unprotected agricultural land converted to urban uses, 
we conduct a comparative static analysis based on the spatial equilibrium condition (16).  
To simplify this condition, we rearrange terms to derive the following polynomial 
expression 
(17)  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() () ( )
1/2
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The spatial equilibrium land-use share is b such that  ˆ ( ) ˆ 0 h b= .  The equilibrium 
outcome is b=  if the PDR program is inactive (i.e., B(t) = 0), and b<  if B(t) > 0.  ˆ 1 ˆ 1
The differential of the polynomial  ( ) 0 h b=  with respect to β and B(t) is 
(18)  () ()( ) ()
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and the implicit derivative of interest is   20
(19)  ( ) ( ) ( )
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The numerator is unambiguously positive for all β > 0, and the denominator is strictly 
positive if the PDR program is active (i.e., B(t) > 0) or if there is positive population 
growth (i.e., g > 0).  Consequently, an increase in PDR program expenditures decreases 
the share of land within the urban boundary  ( ) z t  that is developed for urban uses. 
The comparative static effects of the other exogenous variables may be 
determined in similar fashion, and the signs of the associated derivatives are reported in 
the second column of Table 1.  As expected, an increase in the urban population growth 
rate (g) increases the share of land developed for urban uses.  Also, an increase in the 
fixed amount of the land good consumed by households (L) induces sprawl by 
increasing the urban boundary  ( ) zt.  We assume that marginal changes in L at time t do 
not affect the amount of the land good consumed by households existing at time 0 such 




z  for all t > 0.  Although we might expect this source of development 
pressure to increase the share of land converted to urban uses, the change actually has the 
opposite effect on β.  Given that the earning capacity of each unit of land is reduced 
under lower density development, the price per unit of agricultural land price P
a declines 
as L increases.  As such, the PDR program can make smaller easement payments per 
unit of land E(t) and use the available funds B(t) to protect more farmland.  In similar 
fashion, an increase in the intertemporal discount rate r also decreases the easement 
payment E(t), attracts more land into the PDR program, and decreases the share of land 
converted to urban uses.  Finally, an increase in the commuting cost T increases land   21
prices, reduces the amount of land that can be protected under the PDR program, and 
increases the share of land within the urban boundary  ( ) z t  developed for urban uses. 
We can also measure the impact of changes in the exogenous variables on the 
urban land price  ( )
d , z Pt , and these comparative static effects are summarized in the 
third and fourth columns of Table 1.  By the Chain Rule, the derivative of  ( )
d P t,z  with 
respect to changes in the exogenous variables is composed of direct and indirect effects.  
The direct effect of the exogenous variable is the partial derivative of  ( ) t,z
d P  with 
respect to the exogenous variable of interest.  If the PDR program is active (β < 1), we 
note that equation (16) implies that the equilibrium value of β is an implicit function of 
the exogenous variables.  The indirect effect is the impact of an increase in the exogenous 
variable of interest on  ( ) , z
d Pt  through the share of land available for development (β) if 
the PDR program is active. For example, the direct and indirect effects of an increase in 
L on  ( )
d Pt , z  i s  
(20)  ( ) ( ) ( )
dd d
direct indirect
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In each case, the marginal effect of an increase in β on  ( )
d Pt , z  











is negative, so the indirect effect and the marginal effect of an increase in the exogenous 
variable on β have opposing signs.  Thus, the direct effect of changes in the exogenous 
variables is partially mitigated if the program is active.  For example, an increase in L 
decreases the urban land price, but the direct effect of this change is partially offset by the   22
positive indirect effect resulting from the increase in β --- fewer land units can be 
protected under the PDR program due to the higher land price. The exogenous variables 
also have comparable direct and indirect effects on the price of undeveloped agricultural 
land  ( )
a P t,z
it Y
, and the signs on these effects are identical to the urban land price results 
stated in Table 1. 
=
 
Empirical Model and Estimation Results 
  An econometric model is used to account for the impact of PDR programs on the 
farmland conversion rate over time and across the study area  (Maine-ME, New 
Hampshire-NH, Vermont-VT, Massachusetts-MA, Rhode Island-RI, Connecticut-CT, 
New York-NY,  Pennsylvania-PA, Delaware-DE, and Maryland-MD).  The model is 
specified and estimated for 190 counties in these states for three distinct Census periods, 
1982-1987, 1987-1992, 1992-1997.  A summary of the land converted to urban uses and 
preserved under PDR programs in these states is provided in Table 2, the variables and 
data sources used in this analysis are presented in Table 3, and descriptive statistics 
appear in Table 4.  Figures 1-4 illustrate the level of the farmland preservation effort in 
the region.  
The empirical model for this study will be specified as a linear regression model 
of the form: 
it t it t it t it t t X N P ε β β β β β + + + + + 5 4 3 2 i 1 D              (22) 
where the dependent variable Y is the number of farmland acres per 1,000 acres of total 
land in county   that was converted from rural to urban uses over the five year 
period before time   (1987, 1992, 1997).  The data are obtained from the National 
it
n i ,..., 1 =
t  23
Resources Inventory (NRI) database and other sources (see Table 3).  The explanatory 
variables in the model include an intercept or constant term and state-specific dummy 
variables  (  for each state.  The explanatory variables also include a binary variable 
that indicates PDR activity in each county  , a binary variable indicates PDR activity 
in neighboring contiguous county  , and other factors that may influence the 
conversion of farmland to urban uses ( .   
) it D
) ( it P
)
) ( it N
X it
  The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator is used to estimate the model 
parameters for the three specified time periods, and the model estimation results are 
presented in Table 5.  The R
2 statistics range from 0.57 to 0.68, suggesting that on 
average 60 percent of the dependent variable is explained by the specified independent 
variables.  For each time period seven state-specific dummy variables are included in the 
model, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire and 
Rhode Island.  The results suggest that urbanization varies by state and over time. Some 
states such as Maine are progressively significant over time.  Others such as New 
Hampshire demonstrate decreasing significance over time, and some states such as 
Pennsylvania demonstrate mixed results.   
  For the first estimation period, the parameter estimate suggests that PDRs may 
have reduced urbanization.  During the other two time periods the presence of an active 
PDR program displays a positive influence on the urban development rate, but these 
effects are not statistically significant.  The neighboring PDR variable is not statistically 
significant but has a negative sign, which suggests that the presence of active PDR 
programs does not cause positive spillover effects on neighboring counties.  The 
parameter estimate is larger and more significant in the third time period.  In two of the   24
three periods, the natural amenity scale has a positive sign suggesting that the higher the 
livability of the county the more likely it will be converted from farmland to residential 
use.  The urban influence code is significant and has a negative sign for all three time 
periods, suggesting that a decrease in the urban influence code (less urban character) 
decreases the rate of urban land development.  The parameter for road miles is positive 
and significant suggesting that the larger the road infrastructure in a specific county the 
more likely that land in that county will be converted to urban use. The coefficient on the 
percent of farmers over 60 is positive and is consistent with a priori expectations that 
older farmers are more likely to sell their farmland for development. Thus, we conclude 
that farmers’ demographics do impact the rate of urbanization. The coefficient for income 
is positive and significant suggesting that the higher the income level in the county the 
higher the demand for urban land. Population growth is positive and as expected a 
population increase moves land out of agriculture and into housing.  Finally, as the 
percent of farmers in the county who work more than 200 days off-farm increases, the 
rate of conversion of farmland from rural to urban use increases.  
 
Conclusions 
This study examines the impact of PDR programs on the rate of farmland 
conversion in the Northeast United States.  Data for 190 counties across four Census 
periods (1982-97) is used to specify and estimate an econometric model.  The results of 
the model strongly suggest that PDR programs may have slowed or prevented farmland 
conversion during the first sub-sample period (1982 to 1987).  However, the results 
suggest that PDR programs may not have curbed the rate of urban development during   25
the second and third sub-sample periods.  For all time periods that presence of an active 
PDR program in a neighboring county does not result in positive spillover effects.  In 
addition, the results indicate that other variables included in the model such as income 
exert a significant influence on the rate of farmland conversion. 
  Although the statistical evidence of direct PDR program impact is mixed, it is 
important to note that there are other potential benefits from these farmland preservation 
programs.  First, farmers can benefits from the PDR programs as they are allowed to 
continue farming while their land is enrolled in a PDR program.  As well, the lump-sum 
easement payments may be used to make capital investments or to shift the operation into 
other enterprises that help to sustain the farming business for future generations.  Finally, 
many studies have shown that there are positive amenity benefits (e.g., open space, scenic 
views) associated with the preserved land, and residents of a given area may be willing to 
pay for these benefits (and support the preservation effort) even if the PDR programs do 
not have a substantial impact on the rate of urban development.   26
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Table 1.  Comparative static effects on shares of developed land and urban land price 
 
Exogenous variables  Share of developed 
land, (β) 
Direct effect on 
the urban land 
price, P
d 
Indirect effect on 
the urban land 
price, P
d 
PDR expenditures, B(t) -  None  + 
Population growth, g +  +  - 
Discount rate, r -  -  + 
Land per household, L   - - + 
Commuting cost, T + + - 
 
Note: see equations (20) and (21) and the surrounding discussion for definitions and 
interpretation of the direct and indirect effects.  29
Table 2.  Summary of Development and PDR Preservation Activity in the Study Area 
 
State  Year of First PDR 
Easement Acquisition 








Connecticut 1979  23,209  23,800 
Delaware 1994  16,406  39,100 
Maryland 1980  202,051  166,200 
Massachusetts 1980  34,317  65,100 
New Hampshire  1981  30,733  24,500 
New York  1974  8,091  247,500 
Pennsylvania 1982  120,720  508,100 
Rhode Island  1985  2,901  6,200 
Vermont 1988  63,031  21,600 
   30
Table 3: Definition of Major Explanatory Variables 
 Variable   Description 
Farmland Converted  1000 acres of land converted per county 
Active PDR program  Binary variable that equals 1 if the local PDR 
program enrolled new parcels during the sample 
period. 
Source: county and state PDR program data 
Neighboring PDR program  Binary variable that equals 1 if a neighboring county 
had an active PDR program during the same period.  
Source: county and state PDR program data 
Road miles  Thousand of miles of improved roads in the county 
in 1997. 
Source: Department of Transportation 
Urban influence code  Integer values 1-9: 1 equals a metro county with at 
least 1 million people and 9 equals a non-metro 
county with no towns larger than 2,500 people.  
Source: USDA 
Percent of farmers older than 60  Percent of farmers in the county who are 60 years of 
age or older 
Source:1997 Census of Agriculture 
Farmers working 200+ days off-farm  Percent of farmers in the county who work 200 or 
more days at an off-farm (1=1 percent of farmers) 
Source: 1997 census of Agriculture 
Income  Thousand of U.S. dollars 
Source: Census of Population 
Government payments per acre  U.S. dollars per acre 
Source: 1997 Census of Agriculture 
Natural amenity scale  Composite scale of livability factors (higher values 
indicate that the county is more attractive place to 
live) 
Source: USDA 
Population growth rate  Percent change in county population form 1980 to 
2000 (1.00=1 percent change)  
Source: 1980 and 2000 Census of Population   31
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Data 
Variable Mean  Standard  Deviation  Minimum    Maximum 
New York Dummy  0.27  0.45  0  1 
Maine Dummy  0.68  0.25  0  1 
Rhode Island Dummy  0.32  0.18  0  1 
Connecticut Dummy  0.42  0.21  0  1 
New Hampshire Dummy  0.05  0.22  0  1 
Massachusetts Dummy  0.07  0.25  0  1 
Maryland Dummy  0.12  0.32  0  1 


































































Natural Amenity Scale  -0.13  1.00  -2.94  2.89 
Urban Influence Code 3.642  2.43  1.00  9.00 
Road Miles  1758.99  1064.95  173.06  7308.62 






















Median Household Income  30267  7184  19195  54348 
Population Growth Rate  15.22  23.20  -16.73  153.42 
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Table 5: Parameter Estimates (OLS) 


















































































































  Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic T-ratios.   33
Figure 1:  Timing of First Acquisition of Development Rights in PDR Programs 
       (Study area includes VT, NH, MA, RI, CT, NY, PA, MD, DE) 
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Figure 2:  Acres Preserved in PDR Programs by 1997 
       (Study area includes VT, NH, MA, RI, CT, NY, PA, MD, DE) 
   35
Figure 3:  Percent of County’s 1982 Farmland Preserved by 1997 
       (Study area includes VT, NH, MA, RI, CT, NY, PA, MD, DE) 
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Figure 4:  Ratio of Farmland Converted to Farmland Preserved during 1982 – 1997 
       (Study area includes VT, NH, MA, RI, CT, NY, PA, MD, DE) 
 